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Abstract 
The capital structure of firms has been a widely discussed subject in the world of 
corporate finance in the last decades. The aim of this paper is to analyse how some of its 
determinants previously studied by several authors, either firm characteristics and 
institutional settings, affect the financial structure of said firms. We perform a 
multivariate analysis with OLS using two equations, one for each of the dependent 
variables (market leverage and book leverage). We use a White estimator (diagonal) to 
avoid possible heteroscedasticity problems due to the use of panel data. Our sample 
includes firms from the UK, traditionally labeled as a market-oriented economy, and the 
Eurozone, considered a set of bank-oriented economies, totaling 4337 firms. The results 
suggest that there are no major differences in these two sets, concerning the behaviour of 
the determinants of capital structure. Furthermore, we interpret our results in light of the 
major theories on the subject, namely the trade-off, pecking order and market-timing 
theories. We also note that the 2008 financial crisis did not provoke any apparent change 
in the behaviour of structure determinants. With this work we hope to further understand 
the difference between bank and market oriented economies, as well as compare the main 
theories on the topic of determinants of capital structure of firms, on an empirical level, 
and finally to analyse the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on this topic. 
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Resumo 
A estrutura de capitais das empresas tem sido um tema amplamente discutido no mundo 
das finanças empresariais, nas últimas décadas. O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar como 
certas determinates previamente estudadas por diversos autores, quer sejam 
características de empresas ou características institucionais, afetam a estrutura financeira 
das mesmas. Realizamos uma análise multivariada com OLS usando 2 equações, de 
forma a considerar duas variáveis dependentes alternativas (market leverage e book 
leverage). Usamos um estimador de White (diagonal) para evitar possíveis problemas de 
heteroscedasticidade devido ao uso de dados em painel. A amostra inclui empresas do 
Reino Unido, tradicionalmente identificado como uma economia market-oriented, e a 
Zona Euro, considerada um conjunto de economias bank-oriented. A amostra totaliza 
4337 empresas. Os resultados sugerem que não há diferenças de grande relevância entre 
estes 2 conjuntos, relativamente ao comportamento das determinantes da estrutura de 
capitais. Adicionalmente, interpretamos os nossos resultados à luz das principais teorias 
sobre o tema, nomeadamente a Teoria do Trade-off, da Pecking order e de market-timing. 
Notamos também que a crise de 2008 não provoca nenhuma mudança de relevo no 
comportamento das determinantes da estrutura de capitais. Com este estudo esperamos 
compreender melhor a diferença entre economias bank-oriented e market-oriented, assim 
como comparar, num nível empírico, as principais teorias no tema das determinantes da 
estrutura de capitais, e também analisar o impacto da crise de 2008 na perspetiva deste 
tema. 
 
Palavras-chave: 
Estrutura de capitais, alavancagem financeira, Trade-off, Pecking order, market-oriented, 
bank-oriented. 
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1. Introduction 
The capital structure of firms has been a widely discussed subject in the world of 
corporate finance and the literature on this subject has grown extensively in the last 
decades. 
According to the seminal work of Modigliani & Miller (1958), the capital structure of a 
firm has no relevancy on its value, as well as on the cost of capital, provided that we 
consider several simplifications, among which are the absence of taxes and bankruptcy 
costs. 
The trade-off theory postulates that a firm maximizes its value when the marginal benefit 
of debt equals its marginal cost (ergo the “trade-off”) and, therefore, supports the 
existence of an optimal capital structure. Modigliani & Miller (1963) posited that, by 
taking into consideration corporate taxes , debt would be relevant for the value of the 
firm. Miller (1977) presents the Miller equilibrium, taking into consideration more types 
of taxes. De Angelo & Masulis (1980) point for the importance of non-debt tax shields. 
Kraus & Litzenberger (1973) formally introduce the tax advantage of debt and bankruptcy 
costs into a state preference framework. Jensen & Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) 
analyse optimal capital structure and agency costs. On an alternative point of view, Myers 
(1984) and Myers & Majluf (1984) hypothesize the pecking order theory: to avoid the 
problems brought by asymmetric information, firms should prioritize internal over 
external funding, and on external funding, debt is preferable to equity. We also consider 
one third theory, market timing: the capital structure of firms is the outcome of managers 
trying to time the market (Baker & Wurgler 2002). 
Many studies have been conducted to assess these different theories through empirical 
investigation. Bayrakdaroğlu et al (2013) analyse whether firm-specific determinants in 
the emerging market of Turkey support the main theories on capital structure. Huang & 
Ritter (2005) examine time-series patterns of external financing decisions of publicly 
traded U.S firms, comparing the performance of the trade off, pecking order and market 
timing theories. In overall, researchers have been unsuccessful in isolating one theory as 
the correct predictor of the capital structure of firms. 
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The conception of market and bank-oriented systems considered in our work to define 
the countries derives from the work of Rybczynski, T. (1984). Rajan & Zingales (1995) 
also address the comparison between bank and market-oriented countries, claiming that 
they did not seem to find any systematic difference between the level of leverage in these 
two types of financial system. Antoniou et al (2008) conclude that the capital structure 
decisions of firms are influenced by their environmental and traditional settings. 
In this paper, we analyse the determinants of capital structure of firms in the United 
Kingdom and twelve countries of the Euro Zone (namely, those who joined before 2005). 
The U.K. presents itself as a market-oriented economy, where firms have easier access to 
capital markets. On the other hand, there is the Euro Zone, which we identify as a set of 
bank-oriented economies. Here, financing is more commonly guaranteed through debt. 
Banks perform a vital role in the financing of firms, presumably more so than in the U.K. 
Hence, we aim to analyse if these two sample sets perform similarly, under our 
estimations. Moreover, we test the homogeneity of the results of the Euro zone by 
separating it into two sub-sets. Finally, we try to infer if the 2008 financial crisis had an 
impact on the role of the determinants of structure capital we analyse. We perform a 
multivariate analysis with OLS (ordinary least squares) using two equations, one for each 
of the dependent variables (market leverage and book leverage). We use a White 
estimator (diagonal) to avoid possible heteroscedasticity problems due to the use of panel 
data. For country-specific analysis, we withdraw GDP growth and credit to GDP, in order 
to avoid a near singular matrix. This includes the multi-variate analysis of the U.K.. 
Our paper contributes to the extant literature on capital structure of firms on an empirical 
level. Firstly, we compare two sample sets which, due to the nature of their distinct 
economies, could expectably present different results. Secondly, we evaluate whether 
there is a significant change in the behaviour of the determinants of capital structure 
before and after the 2008 financial crisis. Finally, our paper contributes with an updated 
estimation, ranging from 2005 to 2014, as well as an analysis on the behaviour of the 
variables we used, in light of the main theories of capital structure: the trade-off, pecking 
order and market timing theories. To the best of our knowledge, no work has been done 
with this set of specifications. 
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The results suggest that there are no major differences in these two sets, concerning the 
behaviour of the determinants of capital structure. Also, we note that the 2008 financial 
crisis did not provoke any apparent change in the behaviour of structure determinants. 
This paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 covers previous literature on the subject. 
Section 3 presents the variables used, as well as the sample, descriptive statistics and 
methodology. Results are evidenced on section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
4 
 
2. Literature review 
The literature on capital structures has, in the last decades, grown extensively. In this 
review, we will set our starting point with Modigliani & Miller (1958). According to their 
seminal work, the capital structure of a firm has no relevancy on its value, as well as the 
cost of capital, provided that we consider several simplifications, such as the absence of 
taxes and bankruptcy costs. 
This conception spurred a vast literature in the following decades. Hence, we provide a 
summary of some of the works that followed, namely the trade-off, pecking order and 
market timing theories. 
We also do an overview on the literature most connected to the relation between market-
oriented and bank-oriented economies, concerning structure of capital, which we trace 
back to Rybczynski, T. (1984). 
 
2.1 Theories of Capital Structure 
2.1.1 The Trade-off Theory 
The trade-off theory postulates that a firm maximizes its value when the marginal benefit 
of debt equals its marginal cost, ergo the “trade-off”. Several contributions arose 
concerning what can be perceived as benefit or cost of debt.  
Modigliani & Miller (1963) posited that, by taking into consideration corporate taxes, 
debt would be relevant for the value of the firm. More specifically, an increase in debt 
would always result in an increase in the value of the firm, provided that debt is tax-
deductible. However, if personal income taxes are considered (specifically, those 
concerning personal income from common stock and personal income from bonds), this 
might not be so. Miller (1977) took these 3 forms of taxes into consideration, creating a 
model known as Miller equilibrium. 
Connected to the work of Miller (1977), DeAngelo & Masulis (1980) point for the 
importance of non-debt tax shields, such as depreciation deductions or investment tax 
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credits. They find, in their model, that there is an inverse relation between the level of 
debt and the level of available non-debt tax shields. 
Still concerning the valuation of firms under the trade-off theory, two parameters stand 
out: financial distress and agency costs.  
Kraus & Litzenberger (1973) formally introduce the tax advantage of debt and bankruptcy 
costs into a state preference framework. In their work, they state that, since the firm’s 
financing mix determines the states in which the firm earns its debt obligation, receives 
the tax savings connected to their debt financing, as well as the states in which the firm 
is insolvent and is thus penalized, it comes as a conclusion that these states affect, through 
the financing mix, the market value of the firm. 
In the follow-up of this insight concerning bankruptcy costs, Titman (1984) considers the 
existence of indirect costs of bankruptcy, which are costs created by bankruptcy filing 
that affect other stakeholders than debt and equity holders. Berk et al (2010), on a 
theoretical paper, argue that the cost of bankruptcy borne by the employees can be an 
indirect cost. Indeed, they state that there is evidence that this cost is significant, and that 
it can be seen as a counterbalance to the tax benefits of debt. 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) analyse optimal capital structure and agency 
costs. These costs can derive from potential conflicts between shareholders and managers, 
or shareholders and bondholders. As in most agency relationships, if both the agent and 
the principal are utility maximizers, their interests will not be totally aligned. Ergo, the 
principal will need to incur into certain costs to improve this alignment, thus creating 
agency costs. Jensen & Meckling (1976) define agency costs as the sum of the monitoring 
expeditures by the principal, the bonding expenditures by the agent and the residual loss. 
Mazen (2012) tests the validity of the static trade-off theory on a sample of 121 firms 
over a period from 1998 to 2002. The study reiterates the importance of several 
considerations brought by the trade-off theory. Also, this study is in line with the vast 
majority of papers on capital structure of firms in the previous decades (such as 
Bayrakdaroğlu et al (2013), Kouki & Said (2012), Correia et al. (2015), Gaud et al (2005), 
Frank & Goyal (2009), to name a few), in the sense that while trade-off theory does not 
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surpass other theories (such as the pecking order theory) flawlessly, its merit is repeatedly 
recognized. 
 
2.1.2 The Pecking Order Theory 
The Pecking Order Theory (Myers, 1984 and Myers & Majluf, 1984) hypothesizes that, 
under asymmetric information, equity may become underpriced. If a firm decides to 
finance a new project by issuing equity, it may be that, at first glance, old shareholders 
will be negatively affected, if the underpricing due to new equity does not compensate 
for the Net Present Value (hereafter NPV) of the new project. This might result in 
abandoning positive NPV projects. To avoid this situation, firms should prioritize internal 
funding and, in case of external funding, riskless debt is preferable, followed by risky 
debt, followed by equity. Concordantly, firms would not have a defined optimal leverage 
ratio. 
Empirical research on this theory has not been consensual. While some provide evidence 
that it is a good descriptor of financial behaviour (Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999 and 
Lemmon & Zender, 2008), others arrive at a different conclusion (Leary and Roberts, 
2010 and Frank & Goyal, 2009). Frank & Goyal (2009) claim that the results they 
achieved concerning some variables, namely tangibility, firm size and industry leverage 
do not easily flow from the essence of the pecking order theory. 
 
2.1.3 The Market Timing Theory 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) argued that the capital structure of firms is the outcome of the 
attempts of managers to time the markets. The concept is that firms will issue debt when 
equity is cheap (low market-to-book ratio) and issue equity when it is expensive (high 
market-to-book ratio). Concordantly, managers should not aim for a specific optimal 
capital structure: it will depend on the market conditions.  
The practice of market timing is noted in the several works. Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
showed that leverage and the market-to-book ratio are significantly correlated. Huang and 
Ritter (2005) also find evidence consistent with the market timing theory: equity issues 
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increase when expected equity risk premiums are lower and market-to-book ratios are 
higher. 
 
2.2 Bank-oriented and market-oriented financial systems 
In our work, we define countries as bank-oriented or market-oriented. Our conception of 
market and bank-oriented systems derives from the work of Rybczynski, T. (1984). Bank-
oriented systems are characterized by a large dependence of non-financial firms on 
financing through non-marketable loans provided by banks, predominantly. In a market-
oriented system, on the other hand, non-financial firms are largely dependent on financing 
through capital markets. 
Antoniou et. al. (2008) analyse how firms operating in market-oriented economies and 
bank-oriented economies determine their capital structure, concluding that “the capital 
structure decision of a firm is not only the product of its own characteristics, but also the 
result of environment and traditions in which it operates”. 
Rajan & Zingales (1995) also address the comparison between bank and market-oriented 
countries, claiming that they did not seem to find any systematic difference between the 
level of leverage in these two types of financial system. Furthermore, they suggest, based 
on their evidence, that this difference between financial systems has a bigger effect on 
the type of financing (private or public) than in the amount of leverage. 
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3. Research design 
In this chapter we analyse the underlying research model. First, we identify the variables 
used in this research, as well as their adjacent hypothesis. We then follow to the 
presentation of the sample used. Finally, we present the econometric model to be used. 
 
3.1 Variables 
3.1.1 Leverage 
Concerning the choice of our dependent variable, we had two different approaches 
available: book leverage and market leverage. Between these two, one major difference 
can be expected: book leverage can be considered as backward looking, whereas market 
leverage is expected to be more forward looking (Frank & Goyal, 2009). Ergo, we expect 
forward looking variables to predict market leverage more successfully than book 
leverage. 
Considering book leverage, the following measures are taken into consideration: total 
liabilities to total assets (TL/TA), total debt to total assets (TD/TA), long-term debt to 
total assets (LTD/TA) and total debt to total net assets (TD/TNA). We do not use TL/TA 
because this ratio can be easily affected by liabilities which are merely transactional, with 
no financing purpose (Uddin, 2015). We could use the same train of thought to favour a 
ratio with long-term debt instead of total debt, since it can be considered that short term 
debt usually serves a transactional purpose exclusively. However, this may not be the 
case in many firms. Shivdasani et. al. (2015) suggest that short-term debt is often used as 
a bridge to long-term debt. Bevan & Danbolt (2002) achieve notoriously different results 
with long-term debt and total debt, suggesting that “analyses of gearing based solely upon 
long-term debt provide only part of the story, and a fuller understanding of capital 
structure and its determinants requires a detailed analysis of all forms of corporate debt.” 
Therefore, we use total debt in our analysis, with the ratio TD/TNA, where TNA equals 
total assets minus total liabilities plus total debt (also referred henceforth as 
LEVDTNASS). We favour total net assets over total assets as a denominator because the 
former is not affected by trade credit. 
As for market leverage (LEVM), we use the ratio total debt to market value (MV), where 
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MV equals total assets minus book equity plus market capitalization (Gao & Zhu, 2015).  
 
3.1.2 Tangibility 
The purpose of this variable is to measure the nature of the assets of the firm. It is easily 
understood that tangible assets, such as property, plant and equipment (PPE), are easier 
to be evaluated than intangible assets. Furthermore, tangible assets make for better 
collateral. Considering this, we expect a positive relation between tangibility and 
leverage, under the trade-off theory. 
However, the interpretation of this variable is quite different under the pecking order 
theory. A higher proportion of tangible assets should reduce information asymmetry, thus 
reducing the cost of equity issuances. In this case, there should be a negative relation 
between tangibility and leverage. However, if adverse selection concerns the assets in 
place of the firm, then a higher level of tangibility would only increase adverse selection, 
which would increase the level of debt (Frank & Goyal, 2009) 
In our work, we measure tangibility with the following ratio: 
𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦, 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡
 
3.1.3 Profitability 
Another variable that separates the trade-off and pecking order theories. In the world of 
the trade-off theory, profitable firms should face less financial distress, which would 
allow for higher leverage. Furthermore, profitable firms benefit more from the 
disciplinary role of debt, according to the agency theory.  
According to the pecking order theory, firms should prioritize internal funding over 
external funding. In a sense, debt should be reckoned as a need, not a desire. It stands to 
reason, then, that more profitable firms would be less levered, since they have easier 
access to internal funding. 
In our work, we interpret profitability as: 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡
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3.1.4 Size 
Concerning the aspect of size, larger firms, usually more diversified, should face a lesser 
financial distress. As time passes, they solidify their reputation in the debt markets. 
Considering this conception, there should be a positive relation between size and 
leverage, under the trade-off theory. 
Under the pecking order theory, we expect a similar relation, on the same line of thought: 
as firms grow larger and earn a solid reputation, they have easier access to the debt 
market. This will make firms less likely to resort to equity issuances. 
We measure firm size as follows: 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = ln (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡) 
 
3.1.5 Growth 
Growth is another variable that sets apart the predictions of trade-off and pecking order 
theories. From the perspective of the trade-off theory, growth should reduce leverage. 
According to Frank & Goyal (2009), growth increases costs of financial distress. Indeed, 
growth can even be seen as manifestation of free cash flow, allowing managers to build 
empires. 
From the perspective of the pecking order theory, there should be a positive relation 
between growth and leverage. Investments are costly, thus increasing the likelihood of 
debt financing1. 
In our work, growth is measured as: 
𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = ln(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡) − ln(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1) 
 
3.1.6 Non-debt tax savings 
In the trade-off theory, tax-deductibility is certainly one of the most consensual benefits 
of debt. However, how important is that benefit when a firm can easily use other means 
                                                          
1 This conclusion is presented under the assumption that profitability is fixed. 
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to achieve tax optimization? Indeed, DeAngelo & Masulis (1980) consider that non-debt 
tax savings (NDTS) present themselves as an alternative to tax shield interests. Under this 
perspective, there should be a negative relation between NDTS and leverage. 
However, a different line of thought could lead to an expectation of a positive relation 
between these two variables: if we consider that NDTS is mostly achieved through a high 
level of collaterable fixed assets (Uddin, 2015), then we would return to the logic of 
tangibility, leading to an increase of the leverage ratio. 
In our work, in accordance with Titman & Wessels (1988) and De Miguel & Pindado 
(2001), we use the relation of NDTS to total assets, and we define NDTS as follows: 
𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 −
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡
 
 
3.1.8 Market-timing 
Market-timing theory suggests that firms are more prone to finance themselves through 
equity when their market value is high, and more prone to choose debt when their market 
value is low. The logic behind this line of reasoning is that a high market value might 
indicate an overpricing of the firm, in the eyes of managers, whereas a low market value 
might indicate an underpricing of the firm. Managers seize these moments, preferring 
equity issues, or debt, respectively. 
To measure market-timing, we chose the market-to-book ratio, expressed as total assets 
minus book equity plus market capitalization over total assets (Gao & Zhu, 2015). 
 
3.1.9 Industry median leverage 
Industry median leverage is commonly seen, in the existing literature, as a significant 
variable to predict leverage. Following the reasoning of Frank & Goyal (2009), we present 
two explanations for the use of this variable. Firstly, industry median leverage may reflect 
a set of correlated, although omitted variables. Each industry has its own nature, and this 
may lead firms to manage their capital structure similarly. Industry median leverage may 
be reflecting that unique nature of each industry or, in other words, industry 
heterogeneity. Secondly, this variable may be, by itself, the leverage target for firms in 
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the industry. 
In our work, we calculate industry median leverage (yearly) using market leverage 
(TD/MV). We define each industry using the sector identification of Datastream. 
 
3.1.10 Macroeconomic conditions 
In order to proxy for countries’ institutional environments, we used two macroeconomic 
variables, namely GDP growth and private sector debt to GDP. Concerning GDP growth, 
its effect on leverage is debatable: in an expansion phase, we can expect firms to perform 
better and achieve higher profits. On the other hand, growth opportunities should increase 
in this period. Trade-off and pecking-order theory do not agree on the effects of 
profitability and growth opportunities on leverage, so we do not set an expected sign for 
GDP growth. As to private sector debt to GDP, we expect a positive relation with 
leverage: this can be a proxy to express how bank-oriented is the economy, and it is to be 
expected that firms in bank-oriented countries are more prone to be more leveraged. Both 
variables are measured as a fraction. 
 
3.2 Sample 
All the data used in this paper comes from the Datastream database, with the exception 
of tax rates, GDP growth and private sector debt to GDP, which were all retrieved from 
the OECD database. The full sample we use consists of 4337 firms from the United 
Kingdom and twelve members of the Euro Zone (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Greece, The Netherlands, France, Finland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain). We 
did not include members who joined after 2005. Furthermore, we divided our set of 
economies from the Eurozone into two separate subsets: Euro 4 and N. Euro 4 (Not Euro 
4). In the first subset we consider 4 countries: Germany, France, Italy and Spain. We do 
so in order to enable an easier comparison with previous literature. In the second subset, 
we consider the remaining eight countries. 
We set our analysis on the time period between 2005 and 2014. We only considered firms 
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with four or more years of account data available2. Firms from the financial and insurance 
sectors are excluded, in line with most works on this subject. Moreover, we excluded all 
firms who are not presented as primary quote, major security and equity. All series 
retrieved from Datastream were trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Finally, all 
variables presented in our equations were trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. Comparing the alternative measures of leverage, 
market leverage claims the lowest average values, in all sub-sets, followed by debt to total 
assets and debt to total net assets. This means that the market finds the book value of 
assets overvalued. We also find evidence that firms in the United Kingdom are, on 
average, less levered. This difference is in line with the work of Ramírez & Cabestre 
(2010). Indeed, the average market leverage of a firm in the U.K. is close to 40% less 
than in the Euro zone. This exacerbates the view of the U.K. as a market-oriented 
economy, rather than bank-oriented. Concordantly, the average of market-to-book is 
higher in the U.K. 
Concerning the two sub-sets of the Euro zone, Euro 4 and N. Euro 4, the former appears 
to be less levered, although with more tangibility. On average, GDP growth was close to 
six times higher in Euro 4. 
                                                          
2 By account data we refer to all series retrieved from Datastream which were used in the making of the 
variables used. 
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics  
 
Zone Variable  Mean Obs. 
Total Sample 
Market Leverage 0,1836 34522 
Book leverage (total net assets) 0,3234 36079 
Book leverage (total assets) 0,2195 36708 
Tangibility 0,2443 36501 
Profitability 0,0085 35451 
Size 11,6922 36456 
NDTS -0,0519 35272 
Growth 0,0665 36073 
Market-to-book 1,5653 34277 
Sector median 0,1527 43370 
GDP growth 0,0090 43370 
Credit/GDP 2,0860 43370 
U.K. 
Market Leverage 0,1298 12373 
Book leverage (total net assets) 0,2526 12815 
Book leverage (total assets) 0,1675 13116 
Tangibility 0,2243 13002 
Profitability -0,0283 12522 
Size 11,1574 12925 
NDTS -0,0766 12497 
Growth 0,0807 12692 
Market-to-book 1,7643 12038 
Sector median 0,1306 16220 
GDP growth 0,0134 16220 
Credit/GDP 2,3235 16220 
Euro zone 
Market Leverage 0,2136 22149 
Book leverage (total net assets) 0,3624 23264 
Book leverage (total assets) 0,2485 23592 
Tangibility 0,2554 23499 
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Zone Variable  Mean Obs. 
Profitability 0,0286 22929 
Size 11,9859 23531 
NDTS -0,0383 22775 
Growth 0,0588 23381 
Market-to-book 1,4575 22239 
Sector median 0,1659 27150 
GDP growth 0,0063 27150 
Credit/GDP 1,9441 27150 
Euro 4 
Market Leverage 0,1946 15197 
Book leverage (total net assets) 0,3464 15972 
Book leverage (total assets) 0,2322 16255 
Tangibility 0,2275 16247 
Profitability 0,0273 15736 
Size 11,8586 16151 
NDTS -0,0425 15593 
Growth 0,0662 16055 
Market-to-book 1,5074 15251 
Sector median 0,1622 18920 
GDP growth 0,0085 18920 
Credit/GDP 1,8874 18920 
N.Euro 4 
Market Leverage 0,2553 6952 
Book leverage (total net assets) 0,3974 7292 
Book leverage (total assets) 0,2846 7337 
Tangibility 0,3178 7252 
Profitability 0,0316 7193 
Size 12,2646 7380 
NDTS -0,0294 7182 
Growth 0,0426 7326 
Market-to-book 1,3487 6988 
Sector median 0,1743 8230 
GDP growth 0,0014 8230 
Credit/GDP 2,0744 8230 
16 
 
3.4 Correlation 
Table 2 provides information on all Pearson correlation coefficients. Tangibility presents 
a considerable correlation to market leverage and, to a lesser extent, book leverage (26% 
with the variable using total net assets). Firm size behaves similarly. Market-to-book has 
a correlation of -38% to market leverage. Moreover, profitability appears to be highly 
correlated to NDTS, with a correlation of 83%. 
Table 2 - Pearson correlation coefficients 
  LEVM LEVDTNASS LEVDTASS TANG PROF SIZE NDTS GRA MTB MEDIAN GDPGROWTH CREDITTOGDP 
LEVM 1 * * * * * * * * * * * 
LEVDTNASS 0.77 1.00 * * * * * * * * * * 
LEVDTASS 0.89 0.90 1.00 * * * * * * * * * 
TANG 0.40 0.26 0.36 1.00 * * * * * * * * 
PROF 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.10 1.00 * * * * * * * 
SIZE 0.32 0.28 0.31 0.28 0.35 1.00 * * * * * * 
NDTS 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.83 0.30 1.00 * * * * * 
GRA -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02 0.20 0.04 0.21 1.00 * * * * 
MTB -0.38 -0.18 -0.22 -0.18 -0.13 -0.23 -0.23 0.11 1.00 * * * 
MEDIAN 0.43 0.27 0.35 0.37 0.12 0.28 0.14 -0.11 -0.25 1.00 * * 
GDPGROWTH -0.18 -0.11 -0.12 -0.05 0.06 -0.03 0.03 0.19 0.14 -0.17 1.00 * 
CREDITTOGDP -0.10 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.04 1.00 
 
 
3.5 Methodology 
In this paper, we perform a multivariate analysis with OLS, using two equations: 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑁 + 𝛽8𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 + 𝛽9𝐶𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑂𝐺𝐷𝑃
+ 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐷𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5
∗ 𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑁 + 𝛽8𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻
+ 𝛽9𝐶𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑂𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
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All the variables used were previously identified in section 3.1, except for the last three: 
𝜇𝑖 and 𝜈𝑡 are dummy variables, incorporating cross-section and period fixed effects, 
respectively; 𝜀𝑖𝑡 incorporates the error term. Since we are working with panel data, we 
may be facing a problem of heteroscedasticity. Therefore, we use a White (1980) 
estimator (diagonal). For country-specific analysis, we withdraw GDP growth and credit 
to GDP, in order to avoid a near singular matrix. This includes the multi-variate analysis 
of the U.K.. 
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4. Results 
In this section we will present the results of our estimation. In sub-section 4.1 we will 
present the results for full period (2005-2014) and in 4.2 we will focus on the comparison 
of the results prior to and after 2008. 
 
4.1 Full period 
Results are, for the most part, convergent with previous literature.  
Tangibility takes a positive sign on all sub-sets, in both models. This is in accordance 
with the trade-off theory. Concerning profitability, more profitable firms do tend to have 
less leverage, in all sub-sets, and in both models as well. In opposition to tangibility, this 
sign is in accordance with the pecking order theory. As to size, the sign of its respective 
coefficient is positive in all sub-sets, and again, in both models. Both theories predict this 
outcome. 
Concerning NDTS, the outcome in our models is not as simple as in the former variables. 
If we use market leverage, we achieve a positive sign in all sub-sets, but they are only 
statistically significant in the full sample, the Eurozone and Euro 4. This sign is 
understandable if we follow the reasoning that NDTS might be majorly provoked by high 
tangibility, which would allow for a higher leverage ratio. Indeed, we did achieve a 
positive sign in the tangibility variable. However, if we use book leverage, all expected 
signs are negative (although without statistical significance on the Euro 4 sub-set). This 
would support the reasoning that NDTS are an alternative to interest tax shield, thus 
decreasing the relative attractiveness of debt. 
Firm growth presents itself with a negative sign, if we use market leverage as the 
dependent variable. However, it is not statistically significant in the U.K. and N. euro 4. 
This is in line with the trade-off theory, suggesting that firm growth tends to reduce the 
leverage ratio, by provoking financial distress. If we use book leverage, however, this 
variable is not statistically significant in any sub-set. Indeed, this difference between the 
two models is to be expected: book leverage is more backward looking, and it is to be 
expected to perform worse with forward looking variables, such as growth opportunities. 
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What is more, the same reasoning can be used with market-to-book. If market leverage is 
used, the variable is always statistically significant with 99%. The sign is negative, which 
is in accordance with market-timing theory. However, if we use book leverage, it is not 
significant in the U.K nor in N. Euro 4. In the remaining sub-sets, it presents a positive 
sign. 
As to industry median leverage, all coefficients, in both models, show that is significant 
at a 99% level, with a positive sign. This may hint that managers use the industry median 
leverage ratio as a target. 
Finally, we have the macroeconomic variables, for all sub-sets excluding the U.K. The 
GDP  growth affects leverage negatively, in both models, while domestic credit to GDP 
reveals a positive sign for most sub-sets, except for N. Euro 4 in the market leverage 
model and Euro 4 in the book leverage model. However, this variable is not statistically 
significant in the Euro zone and Euro 4 (market leverage model) and the Euro zone and 
its two sub-sets (book leverage model).
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Table 3 - Model estimation of Levm(i,t) by zone  
  Full Sample U.K. Euro zone Euro 4 Neuro4 
  Total Af.2008 Bef.2008 Total Af.2008 Bef.2008 Total Af.2008 Bef.2008 Total Af.2008 Bef.2008 Total Af.2008 Bef.2008 
Intercept -0,34*** -0,32*** -0,53*** -0,22*** -0,25*** -0,34*** -0,42*** -0,39*** -0,64*** -0,47*** -0,38*** -0,72*** -0,27*** -0,33*** -0,4*** 
Tang 0,12*** 0,13*** 0,14*** 0,12*** 0,14*** 0,12*** 0,12*** 0,12*** 0,16*** 0,16*** 0,14*** 0,2*** 0,06*** 0,06** 0,07** 
Prof -0,15*** -0,13*** -0,14*** -0,08*** -0,09*** -0,12*** -0,19*** -0,16*** -0,16*** -0,17*** -0,14*** -0,14*** -0,24*** -0,21*** -0,19*** 
Size 0,04*** 0,04*** 0,05*** 0,02*** 0,03*** 0,04*** 0,05*** 0,04*** 0,06*** 0,05*** 0,05*** 0,07*** 0,04*** 0,04*** 0,05*** 
NDTS 0,02*** 0,02** 0,02 0 0,01 0,03 0,03*** 0,02** 0,01 0,04*** 0,03** 0,01 -0,01 -0,01 0 
Growth -0,01*** -0,01* 0 0 0 0,01 -0,01*** -0,01* 0 -0,01*** -0,01* -0,01 0 -0,01 0,01 
MTB -0,02*** -0,02*** -0,02*** -0,02*** -0,02*** -0,02*** -0,03*** -0,04*** -0,02*** -0,02*** -0,03*** -0,02*** -0,04*** -0,06*** -0,03*** 
Ind.med 0,47*** 0,38*** 0,4*** 0,53*** 0,49*** 0,25** 0,42*** 0,33*** 0,43*** 0,43*** 0,36*** 0,45*** 0,38*** 0,24*** 0,35*** 
GDP grw -0,66*** -0,39*** -0,16* --- --- --- -0,65*** -0,35*** -0,2* -0,76*** -0,49*** -0,14 -0,56*** -0,31*** -0,17 
credit_GDP 0,01*** 0,02** 0 --- --- --- 0,01 0,02* 0 0,01 -0,03* 0,01 -0,02*** 0,04* 0,01 
R 0,83 0,88 0,92 0,78 0,83 0,90 0,84 0,89 0,92 0,84 0,89 0,92 0,83 0,88 0,92 
Adj.R 0,80 0,85 0,87 0,74 0,79 0,83 0,82 0,86 0,88 0,82 0,86 0,87 0,81 0,86 0,88 
                
Results of OLS estimations of panel data regression, with cross-section and period fixed effects. Dependent variable is Levm(i,t) = Total debt / (total assets minus book 
equity plus market capitalization); TANG = Property, plant and equipment / Total assets; Prof = EBIT / Total assets; Size = ln(Total assets); NDTS = EBIT – Interest 
expense on debt – (Taxes paid / Tax rate); Growth = ln(Total assets i,t) – ln( total assets i,t-1); MTB = (Total assets – book equity + market capitalization) / total assets; 
Ind.med = industry median leverage; GDP grw = growth of GDP (OECD). Credit_GDP = private sector debt to GDP (OECD); Full sample = United Kingdom, Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Greece, The Netherlands, France, Finland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain; U.K. = United Kingdom; Euro zone = Full sample minus 
United Kingdom; Euro 4 = Germany, France, Italy and Spain; Neuro4= Euro zone minus Euro 4. 
The sample can be either including all observations from 2005-2014 (Total), 2005-2007 (Bef.2008) or 2008-2014 (Af.2008). *,** and *** denote coefficients significance 
at 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively. 
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Table 4 - Model estimation of Levdtnass(i,t) by zone  
Results of OLS estimations of panel data regression, with cross-section and period fixed effects. Dependent variable is Levdtnass(i,t) = Total debt / (Total assets – total 
liabilities + total debt); TANG = Property, plant and equipment / Total assets; Prof = EBIT / Total assets; Size = ln(Total assets); NDTS = EBIT – Interest expense on 
debt – (Taxes paid / Tax rate); Growth = ln(Total assets i,t) – ln( total assets i,t-1); MTB = (Total assets – book equity + market capitalization) / total assets; Ind.med = 
industry median leverage; GDP grw = growth of GDP (OECD). Credit_GDP = private sector debt to GDP (OECD); Full sample = United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Greece, The Netherlands, France, Finland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain; U.K. = United Kingdom; Euro zone = Full sample minus United 
Kingdom; Euro 4 = Germany, France, Italy and Spain; Neuro4= Euro zone minus Euro 4. 
The sample can be either including all observations from 2005-2014 (Total), 2005-2007 (Bef.2008) or 2008-2014 (Af.2008). *,** and *** denote coefficients significance 
at 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively. 
  Full Sample U.K. Euro zone Euro 4 Neuro4 
  Total Af.2008 Bef.2008 Total Af.2008 Bef.2008 Total Af.2008 Bef.2008 Total Af.2008 Bef.2008 Total Af.2008 Bef.2008 
Intercept -0,24*** -0,22*** -0,76*** -0,13** -0,19* -0,59*** -0,32*** -0,11 -0,84*** -0,35*** -0,18 -0,83*** -0,09 0,17 -0,65** 
Tang 0,17*** 0,17*** 0,16*** 0,18*** 0,17*** 0,19*** 0,16*** 0,16*** 0,14*** 0,22*** 0,2*** 0,18*** 0,06* 0,07 0,08 
Prof -0,24*** -0,21*** -0,25*** -0,09*** -0,11*** -0,17*** -0,39*** -0,33*** -0,36*** -0,38*** -0,31*** -0,38*** -0,4*** -0,33*** -0,29** 
Size 0,04*** 0,03*** 0,08*** 0,02*** 0,03*** 0,06*** 0,05*** 0,02*** 0,09*** 0,05*** 0,04*** 0,1*** 0,03*** 0 0,07*** 
NDTS -0,07*** -0,06*** -0,14*** -0,1*** -0,05 -0,13* -0,08*** -0,08*** -0,14** -0,04 -0,04 -0,15** -0,23*** -0,3*** -0,09 
Growth 0,01 0,01* 0,01 0 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,02** 0 0,01 0,03** 0 0,02 0,01 0,01 
MTB 0* 0 0 0 0 0 0,01* 0 0,01 0,01** 0,01 0 0 -0,01 0,03 
Ind.med 0,36*** 0,35*** 0,34*** 0,48*** 0,44*** 0,44** 0,31*** 0,33*** 0,27** 0,33*** 0,41*** 0,25* 0,22*** 0,12 0,26 
GDP grw -0,59*** -0,28*** -0,11 --- --- --- -0,46*** -0,14* -0,05 -0,85*** -0,51*** -0,68 -0,34*** -0,02 0,17 
credit_GDP 0,02** 0,06*** 0,02 --- --- --- 0,01 0,05** 0,02 -0,02 -0,03 -0,01 0 0,1*** 0,01 
R 0,77 0,83 0,90 0,73 0,80 0,89 0,78 0,84 0,90 0,78 0,84 0,90 0,77 0,84 0,90 
Adj.R 0,73 0,79 0,83 0,68 0,75 0,81 0,74 0,80 0,83 0,75 0,81 0,83 0,74 0,80 0,84 
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4.2 The 2008 Financial crisis 
Until now we have presented an estimation over the period between 2005 and 2014. 
However, we should consider the possibility that the 2008 financial crisis might have 
altered the impact of the determinants of capital structure of firms. Ergo, we separated 
our sample in two subsets: 2005 to 2007 and 2008 to 2014. The methodology used is the 
same as in the full period sample estimation 
Results show that, in general, signals hold in both samples, in comparison with 2005-
2014, as can be attested in tables 3 and 4. However, some determinants lose statistical 
significance. Growth, before 2008, is not statistically significance (at 90%), in any of the 
set of economies analysed. The same goes for credit_GDP. On the other hand, Prof 
maintains a negative coefficient and statistically significant on all accounts. A similar 
outcome can be seen for Tang (+), Size (+) and Ind.med (+), with the exception of the     
N. euro 4 subset when the dependable variable is book leverage - in this case most 
determinants lose statistical significance.  
 We conclude that, overall, the 2008 financial crisis did not change how firms manage 
their leverage ratio. 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper studies the determinants of capital structure in firms from the Euro Zone and 
the United Kingdom. The main objective is to determine whether there are quantifiable 
differences in the impact that certain variables have in capital structure. The United 
Kingdom is traditionally seen as a market-oriented economy, whereas the Euro Zone 
presents itself as a group of several bank-oriented economies. Understandably, this could 
result in different approaches, concerning capital structure. Moreover, we evaluate the 
results by comparing them with the outcomes predicted by different theories of capital 
structure, namely the trade-off, pecking order and market-timing theories. Our results 
show that these 2 sets are more similar than what could be expected, performing very 
similarly under our estimations. 
Furthermore, we notice that when we used book leverage as the dependent variable, 
instead of market leverage, variables which are commonly seen as forward looking (such 
as growth opportunities and market-to-book ratio) did not perform so well. 
Finally, we divided our sample into 2 separate periods, 2005 to 2007 and 2008 to 2014. 
The purpose of this is to isolate the period prior to the financial crisis and the period after 
it. Our results show that, in general, there are no relevant differences when we separate 
our sample into these 2 time periods. 
Concerning how the major capital structure theories fared, we conclude the following: 
trade-off theory predicted correctly that higher tangibility or firm growth result in a higher 
leverage ratio. However, it failed to predict the sign of the coefficient of profitability. This 
prediction conflicted with pecking order theory, which predicted right: higher 
profitability results in lower leverage. As to size, both theories succeeded: bigger firms 
result in a higher leverage ratio. Finally, NDTS and market-to-book ratio achieved 
different signs on our two estimations. If we consider market leverage as our dependent 
variable, NDTS provides a positive sign, whereas market-to-book affects leverage 
negatively. If we instead consider book leverage, NDTS provides a negative sign, while 
market-to-book influences leverage positively. Market timing theory predicts a negative 
relation between market-to-book and leverage ratio. 
In summary, concerning the determinants of capital structure of firms, our work showed 
that: market-oriented economies might be more similar to bank-oriented economies than 
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what could be expected; considering 2 sub-sets inside the Euro Zone, this monetary area 
showed remarkable harmonization; concerning the 2008 financial crisis, there was no 
noticeable change in the determinants of the capital structure of firms. 
Regarding future research, we emphasize the merit of incorporating adjustment costs in 
the analysis, as well as broadening the sample, taking into consideration more market-
oriented countries and the most recent members of the Euro Zone. 
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